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I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the intent and effect of 
American legislation directed against the participation of U.S. nationals 
and business in foreign boycotts, notably the Arab boycott of Israel. 
Since 1965, U.S. law has declared participation in foreign boycotts or 
restrictive trade practices to be against American policy. Unfortunately, 
this policy was not strongly enforced. When trade between the United States 
and Arab countries expanded after 1973, American companies had no clear basis 
on which to resist participatj on in the Arab boycott of Israel. In 1976, the 
u.s. Commerce Department repo1·tod tllat, from April through September ot that 
year, American exports to Arab states made in compliance with boycott conditions 
totaLled more than $3 billion. This was double the total for the preceding 
six months. 
Faced with these statistics and a growing outcry from the American 
public, the U.S. government took the following actions: 
By Presidential order, effective December 1, 1975, all American 
firms and individuals were prohibited from discriminating against other 
Americans on the basis of race, colour, religion, sex or national origin. 
The U.S. tax laws were changed in late 1976 to deny certain 
foreign tax benefits to u.s. companies cooperating with international 
boycotts. 
The President signed in June 1977 a comprehensive law outlawing 
all U.S. participation in international boycotts. 
To understand the intent of these laws, one must distinguish among 
various aspects of the Arab boycott of Israel. 
First, the boycott interferes with basic civil rights. Numerous 
individuals and firms are barred from doing business directly or indirectly 
with Arab states solely because of their race, religion or sex, or the 
race, religion or sex of their officers, directors or shareholders. Of the 
more than 1,800 companies and individuals believed to be on 21 secret Arab 
blacklists, many are there simply because their officers or directors are 
Jewish. 
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This is the most reprehensible aspect of any boycott. The new U.S. 
law absolutely forbids Americans from complying with boycott demands based 
on these factors. I understand the French Penal Code was also recently 
amended to prohibit French public servants and citizens from agreeing to such 
discriminatory requests. 
The second major aspect of a boycott is economic. In this, we must 
distinguish between primary and secondary boycotts. Under a primary boycott, 
citizens of one state are forbidden from doing business with citizens 6f 
another. In practice, for example, Americans may not trade with Cubans and 
Arabs may not trade with Israelis. Citizens of countries which are not 
parties to the dispute are not affected. A primary boycott is a regrettable, 
but w · dely acce1:.:ed, tool of international warfare. The American antiboycott 
leqislation does not interfere with the operation of such primary boycotts. 
Under a secondary boycott, one of the enemy states tries to extend its 
trade restrictions to neutral, third countries. In practice, the Arabs deny 
trade not only to Israelis but also to Americans and Europeans who do 
business directly or indirectly with Israelis. The effect of a secondary 
boycott is to divide the industries of innocent countries into those companies 
which can do business with the boycotting state and those which cannot. This 
discrimination seriously restricts freedom of trade and limits competition. 
The Arab boycott of Israel is virtually unique in imposing these secondary 
restraints upon third parties. 
The antiboycott law ·signed by President Carter attacks this secondary 
boycott by forbidding American companies and individuals from agreeing not to 
do business with Israel as a condition of doing business with the Arabs. It 
also tries to prevent black-listing of firms doing business with Israel by 
forbidding Americans from responding to boycott-related requests for information 
about their business dealingswith Israel or with firms which do business with 
Israel. The law covers not only American firms operating in the United States 
but also any permanent U.S. establishment of a foreign firm and any 
subsidiary controlled by a U.S. firm resident in a foreign country, except 
where the U.S. law conflicts with the law of that foreign country as to 
activities exclusively within that foreign country. 
It is too early to predict the full impact of this antiboycott law 
since regulations will not become effective for at least· three months. But 
for several reasons we feel that the effect of the law on U.S. /Arab relations 
will not be severe or long-term. First, the Arabs have demonstrated on 
numerous occasions that they will not allow their secondary boycott to interfere 
with a productive trade relationship. Many American companies, principally 
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hotel chains, banks and defence contractors, trade with the Arab states 
and Israel. Second, many Arab businessmen have privately objected to the 
secondary boycott since it restricts them from doing business with black-
listed American companies such as Coca-Cola, Ford and Xerox. Third, 
Arab boycott operations have already been changed to take account of the 
1975 restrictions imposed upon American compliance with requests for 
discrimination based upon race, colour, religion, sex or national origin. 
There is another cause for uncertainty as to the impact of the 
American antiboycott legislation. We do not yet know the extent to which 
similar action will be taken by other trading partners of the Arabs. We 
note a few very encouraging signs. In addition to the French law referred to 
earlier, regula~ions in the Netherlands and Germany, we understand, 
rest:rict compliance with certain aspects of the Arab boycott. Furthermore, 
the Canadian Government in October indicated it would deny official support 
to any trade conducted in compliance with the Arab boycott. The new 
British Foreign Secretary also announced in Parliament in March that he was 
"firmly opposed to the boycott" and would "welcome discussions with the new 
American Administration about their new measures." Finally, written 
remarks of EC Commissioner Claude Cheysson in the European Parliament in 
November indicated that the boycott was contrary to the "spirit and 
principles of the cooperation which the Community wishes to establish with 
the Arab countries" and might violate Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome as well as bilateral agreements between the Community and several 
Arab states. 
We welcome these initiatives on the part of the European Community 
and look forward to a broad international commitment to oppose secondary 
boycotts which inhibit open competition and impair free trade. 
0 0 
0 
3 
PE 49.545 



